.
To Lord Clarendon, Foreign Secretary of Her Majesty’s Government:
In respect of my lord’s wishes, I submit this memorandum on the situation in the Ottoman Empire (the government thereof hereafter referred to as the Sublime Porte, or simply the Porte). You are well aware that for the Porte, the situtation has become a crisis due to the Russian invasion of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia on 3 July. Per your request of 7 July, on learning this news, I have composed this memorandum, outlining the situation, analysing the Russian actions thus far, and providing a series of measures we can take to protect our interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The ostensible reason for the present crisis is a churchwardens’ quarrel, in which we do not take part. The true reason is a change in influence patterns on the Sultan and his ministers. Russian claims to control over the Christian populations of the Empire stem from the 1774 Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, and in February 1852, the Porte had agreed that Russian claims to Orthodox control of the church had precedence.[1] However, in December of last year, the French ambassador, the Marquis de Lavalette, succeeded in convincing the Porte to transfer control of the Church of the Nativity to the Catholic monks resident in Jerusalem.[2] Lavalette proved more pressing than the Russian delegation, to the point that he was able to convince Sultan Abdul-Mejdid to replace his Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister with French-oriented members of the Council (their Cabinet).[3] In response to French victory, the Russian government sent Prince Alexander Menshikov on a mission to restore lost Russian influence at the Porte. He arrived in Constantinople at the beginning of March of this year and forced the resignation of the pro-French foreign minister.[4] Negotiations went badly, with Menshikov accepting no compromise on his demands and Mehmet Ali, the Grand vizier, unable to grant the extension of Kutchuk-Kainardji that Menshikov had been sent to obtain. Menshikov’s demands included Russian confirmation of all Orthodox patriarchs for life, eliminating the prerogative of the Porte to dismiss a patriarch. Because patriarchs function as civil servants for the Christian populations as well as spiritual guides, the Russian demands would have weakened the authority of the Porte over its Christian populations, already lately restless and looking at the revolutions of the West as inspiration.[5] When Mehmet Ali proved unco-operative, Menshikov convinced the Sultan to have him replaced by his predecessor, Reschid Pasha, on 13 May.[6] The Holy Places dispute had been solved with Rifaat Pasha, the new Foreign Minister, due to the influence of our ambassador, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, but the greater Russian questions of influence remained open.[7] Reschid was unable to to accede to those demands, so Menshikov broke off relations with the Porte on 21 May.
At Menshikov’s return to Russia, the Porte received an ultimatum threatening the occupation of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia if they did not capitulate to Russian terms. The Porte had eight days to reconsider the Russian proposals or face the occupation of their European borderlands.[8] Reshid sent a polite refusal to what staff remained of the Russian legation, which promptly left Constantinople. On 3 July, Russian troops crossed the River Pruth, the border between Moldavia and Russia.[9]
In Petersburg, as early as January, Nicholas had been making noises about war. At a reception, he spoke to our ambassador, Sir George Seymour, attempting to pin down Her Majesty’s Government’s opinion on the health of the Ottoman Empire. Nicholas made it very clear that he believed the collapse would come sooner rather than later and sought an understanding with us on partition.[10] Seymour was non-committal and said only that Her Majesty was certain that the Empire had long life in it yet and recommended that the “sick man” be treated gently, in the hope he might recover.[11] Seymour had reported military demonstrations in the Southern Russian region bordering Moldavia, but neither man referred to them in the series of conversations Nicholas initiated over the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire.[12] Seymour questioned other members of the government but received no answers as to the troop movements.[13]
Russia’s threatening posture during the Menshikov embassy frightened the French as much as it did Mehmet Ali. The French ambassador was not in residence at the time, and neither was Stratford, but Mehmet Ali requested some show of support from both the French and the British governments. The Admiralty commander in Malta forwarded the request to us, where it was prudently denied, but the French were spooked and allowed their chargé to call their Mediterranean fleet as far as Salamis.[14] When Menshikov cut off relations, the Cabinet ordered our fleet as far as Besika Bay, just outside the Dardanelles, where the French met us from Salamis.[15] We granted Stratford the ability to call the fleet to defend Constantinople if he believed action was necessary. Though there has not yet been time to receive a further dispatch from Stratford, he has shown a desire to end the disagreement peacefully and is unlikely to have called the fleet himself.[16] The fleet is still there.
Russia appears to have become tired of waiting for the “sick man of Europe” to die. In the last war it fought against the Porte, Russia gained access to the Danube delta.[17] A successful war against Persia delivered control of the Caucasus.[18] Carving off Muslim lands is a realistic goal for the Russian army. The quarrel with France over internal influence is not incidental, but neither is it likely to be the true reason Russian troops are now camped in Moldavia. Ottoman reorientation towards Western Europe has resulted in the removal of certain Russian privileges. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi [19] closed the Straits to all but Russian warships, but the Straits Convention revoked these privileges, closing the Straits to all warships in time of peace.[20] International pressure had cost Russia her outlet to the Mediterranean. A military threat does not have to end in war in Turkey,[21] but if the Porte continues to hold firm, Russia is not adverse to war. Preparations for the potential invasion of the Principalities began before diplomatic pressure had even begun. The Ottoman state is unlikely to survive another war without losing additional territory. Territory in the east will bring Russia even closer to India, towards which her Persian incursions have begun a path, and territory in the west will sooner or later eliminate the Ottoman buffer in Europe. Russian strategy in the Middle East has been to never let a defeat go unavenged.[22] The lack of diplomatic success may be construed as a defeat requiring swift and firm action. Carving off more Ottoman territory and further weakening the Porte, perhaps even to the point of collapse, would be in line with both positions. Russia’s methods are consistent with war rather than diplomacy: the pattern of mobilization, ultimata, and occupation of the Danubian principalities have been preludes to war for the past fifty years.[23]
As for the other participants, the Porte is difficult to discern, while the French have proved more wary of Russian actions than we have. Reschid was Grand Vizier during the last war lost to Russia, and he and Rifaat Pasha, the Foreign Minister, are considered to be conciliatory to Russian demands. However, the Porte did refuse the ultimatum, and previous pressure this year, under Austria’s Count Leiningen, had proved successful.[24] Leiningen had allowed for compromise on the sticking points, however, and Menshikov did not. Either Menshikov was ordered not to compromise or he was sent because Nicholas knew he would not compromise. The Porte’s bellicosity towards Russia is unknown: they were treated very badly by Menshikov’s demands for personnel changes. Additionally, early French support must have an influence on the Porte, as well as the presence and advice of Stratford de Redcliffe. The French are likely to take a firm stand immediately and advocate war, based on their initial military movements, while Stratford is angry that we sent the fleet to Besika Bay. At this point, the Porte could go either direction.
Each state involved has structural factors that affect the decisions and actions thus far taken. The Russian government has always maintained close control of major foreign policy initiatives.[25] There is not a decision making body, simply Nicholas, his Foreign Minister Karl Nesselrode, and perhaps a few other advisers. Nicholas makes the final decisions, with the advice of Nesselrode and others that he trusts. The army lacks a well-developed chain of command and very little money has been spent on modernising equipment, including railroads and telegraph lines.[26] Any war fought away from St Petersburg will be controlled by the local commander, as the troops in Moldavia are now. France has reordered itself since Napoleon III’s coup d’état, and the current minister for war, Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, assisted in that coup, elevating the status of the military.[27] Additionally, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte was elected on the strength of his uncle’s image and a desire to return to the glories of the Empire. Bellicosity is to be expected under these conditions. As for our own government, we must remember that the Navy prefers its orders to come from the Cabinet and dislikes delegated authority.[28] We are lucky that they did not respond with the French when our chargé, Rose, panicked along with Benedetti and attempted to order the fleet to Vourla Bay. It was too early at that point to tell what would happen in negotiations. Finally, important for all concerned, are the weather patterns in the eastern Mediterranean. The fleet cannot sit in Besika Bay indefinitely. Heavy weather comes up in October, and the bay is open, providing no protection for the ships. If October comes without a settlement, either the fleet will have to retreat to Salamis or proceed into the Dardanelles, which may lead to an accusation of breaking the Straits Convention. As for the Russian army, the autumn rains will keep them in place through the winter if they do not vacate the principalities by October.[29]
Internal political considerations may well play a role in the actions thus far taken. Nicholas no longer depends on experienced civil servants. He distrusts his ministers: recall that his 1844 visit to London was conducted without the usual warnings because he did not want to announce that he was leaving the country. Russian society has long been based in arbitrary privileges, and Nicholas’ court has only grown worse over the past few years.[30] He loves the army, but he also fears it, since his first act as tsar was to put down the Decembrist rising, led by young army officers.[31] He considers his ministers to be like military adjutants, extensions of his personal will.[32] Politically, a Russian-oriented group has evolved in competition with the traditionally European-oriented ruling class. Menshikov has been described as a “pure Russian” in the political sense, as opposed to Count Alexis Orlov, who would have made a better negotiator with the Porte.[33] Nesselrode, the Foreign Minister, is a European. German by birth but entirely Russian in his professional life, he has maintained a European orientation throughout his service to Nicholas’ predecessors.[34] He should be Nicholas’ foremost adviser, but the actions are inconsistant with his style. Nesselrode dislikes Asian entanglements [35] and registered disagreement with Near East expansion at the time of the 1828 war.[36] He may be a moderating influence on the tsar, but it seems Nicholas is acting alone to gain the support of the Russian faction.
The Ottoman empire is simply such a mess that politicking is unlikely to affect our policy very much. The Sultan is worthless: he succeeded to the throne at the age of sixteen, his mother chose his advisers, and Reschid Pasha has remained in power ever since, except for the brief interlude where the French succeeded in transfering Mehmet Ali to Grand Vizier (he had been the Commerce Minister).[37] The Sultan is easily influenced; so long as the Russians have left, Stratford should succeed in whatever we wish. Public opinion is of no concern, and while Reschid has Russian sympathies, he has also worked with Stratford and been far more keen on implimenting reform than the Sultan has.[38] Stratford has proved an important functionary in Porte politics, as important as any Ottoman ministers. The Council should do whatever we order them, through Stratford.
In response to the Russian invasion, we have a variety of options. Simplest would be not to act. We could remove the fleet, order Stratford to let the Sultan alone, and leave the quarrel to those who started it. However, our business interests would be unhappy that we abandoned the Porte, and their clients, to whatever fate the Russians and French have in mind. Our government is shaky enough that I am certain Lord Aberdeen would not want to risk a vote of no confidence.[39] We could use Seymour’s connection to Nicholas to determine what concessions the Russians need in order to withdraw their troops. A peace negotiation feels futile, however, considering the rough manner in which Menshikov treated the Sultan’s ministers. An insult to the servant is an insult to the master in the Ottoman culture, and while the Porte may prefer peace to war, it does not feel it can give in to the demands delivered by Menshikov. His manner in delivering them is likely to make the Sultan and the Council act more obstinantly than if he had treated them respectfully from the moment of his arrival. Additionally, since negotiation was not an option for Menshikov, it appears Nicholas was prepared for war with the Porte and even sought it rather than accede on any of his enumerated points. Peace negotiations would take time, and time, because of the coming autumn weather, is too valuable to waste on a pointless venture.
We could let the Turks take the lead. The Porte has a number of options: it can give in to Russian demands, it can give an ultimatum for peaceful withdrawal, it can declare war (and may already have done so), or it can abandon the occupied provinces. Nicholas seeks the first outcome, but with Stratford in Constantinople, further resistance to Russian demands seems likely. He will encourage resistance, and his presence will strengthen the resolve of the Porte. A declaration of war would be the expected action, but the Porte does not always do what is expected. Due to its fragile situation, it is not usually given to belligerance. An ultimatum thus seems more likely than an outright declaration of war. The Porte could simply abandon the occupied provinces. Such an action would deprive Nicholas of his only bargaining chip, but it would weaken the Porte while strengthening Russia. Russia and Austria are already concerned about their common border, and the transfer of Moldavia and Wallachia to Russian control would extend that border. Additionally, it would provide Russia with the entire Danube delta, thus delivering the end point of the major trade route through Central Europe into Russian hands. As the border situation now stands, neither Russia nor the Porte can completely control trade from the Danube River to the Black Sea. Austria depends on the Danube River trade, and if the Porte gave up the Danubian provinces, it would likely see a rupture of relations with Austria and the beginning of a stronger conflict, though perhaps not war, between Austria and Russia. It seems unlikely that the Porte would give up the ability to trade easily with Europe, so the provinces should remain safely Ottoman. Separate French action is likely to help the Porte to stand firm against Russia. If the Porte has not already declared war and has not yet given an ultimatum for the removal of Russian troops, they should be encouraged to follow the latter course of action.
We cannot allow the French to be the only supporters of Ottoman actions against Russia. If we remain aloof, we will lose prestige in Constantinople and consequently jeopardise our trade and banking relations with the Porte. Co-ordination with the French government is imperative. Nicholas despises Napoleon,[40] and while he may have good reasons for it, we cannot allow our usual preference for Nicholas to permit Napoleon to take over our position with the Porte. If Nicholas is correct and Napoleon does seek to expand in the manner of his uncle, an alliance may be the only way to curb those expansionist tendencies. The political climate in France is such that a return to empire and the dissolution of the legislature were approved in a plebiscite. Napoleon has the support to do what he likes. We must work with Napoleon in order to protect our own interests. If the French take action yet again while we wait and see what will happen, they will be lauded in Constantinople as strong, brave, and loyal. If the French lag behind us, we must be convinced that our plan of action is correct. The French have already proved more bellicose than we have, and if they do not go along with our action, then we will have stuck our necks out too far and the consequences could be dire.
We do have the option of declaring war against Russia, but I cannot in all conscience recommend such an action. While the Porte would be relieved that we had made the decision and would take on the burden of a great deal of the fighting, I do not believe we have the public support necessary. Diplomatic pressure to protect our interests is one thing, but war with a friendly power is quite another. Nicholas believes that he and Her Majesty share the same interests in the Near East. He does not mind a war with the Porte, but he has made numerous offers to us to share the spoils, so to speak. A declaration of war on our part would embroil both of us in a war on a scale for which neither is prepared. We are simply not on a war footing, while Russia is already prepared. The war itself, separate from the diplomatic nightmare, would be a terrible mess. It would be impossible to keep to the seas when the Russians appear to have begun hostilities in order to gain Turkish territory. Only our navy is currently prepared to begin fighting, and the war on land could not begin until spring.
The one action that we cannot allow is a war between Russia and the Porte in which no other European powers lend aid. Russia has invaded two Christian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. My Lord Russell was quite correct in his memorandum of 19 June. The Russian army is stronger and better prepared than the Turkish army, and a levy in the nearest provinces would not provide soldiers loyal to the Sultan. The Turkish army could suffer no worse reverse than to lose sixty per cent of its infantry due to desertion, only to see them reappear on the side of the Russians. We are unprepared to stop the inevitable Russian advance on land, and actions on the seas would not slow the movement of the army now in place.[41] My Lord Palmerston agrees that military support would be necessary should the situation come to blows. At minimum, we would have to provide officers and equipment to supplement the Ottoman forces. He disagrees with Russell as to the chance of mass desertion of Christian soldiers as well as the capacity of the Russian army in the field.[42] It does seem to be clear, however, that the invasion of the principalities will start a war between Russia and the Porte, and the Porte is not strong enough to unilaterally hold back the Russian army.
In light of the hostile situation, I believe a middle path is appropriate. In 1849, during the Extradition affair, we sent warships into the Dardanelles in support of the Porte.[43] The case of peacetime versus war was far more murky in that instance than it is today. Russia’s invasion of the Danubian provinces is a casus belli, and though war has not yet been declared (in the best case scenario), peace is hardly in the air, either. If war has been declared, the we are free to enter the Straits according to the Convention of 1844. Moving our squadron into the Dardanelles serves a variety of purposes. It tells Nicholas that we regard his actions as warlike. It provides a strong statement to the Porte that we support them in their freedom from Russian manipulation. If hostilities break out, we have already taken a forward position. And if peace negotiations prove possible, they can take as long as is necessary because we will not be forced to withdraw due to weather. Co-ordination with the French is essential. Ideally, the combined fleet currently at Besika Bay should be moved into the Dardanelles, and Stratford shall retain the power to call the fleet to Constantinople itself if necessary. A British war with Russia will not follow from this action, but it will tell Nicholas that we no longer share his interests in the Porte. The combined fleet will entail an alliance with France, giving us an eye on Napoleon and preventing unilateral action on his part that may be detrimental to our interests. Additionally, the presence of the French will give support to our entrance of the Straits, which may prove important in confining the conflict.
In short, we should take up an advanced position now and start to plan for the worst case scenario. We know that war is a distinct possibility, and while we may be able to prevent an outbreak of hostilities, we should begin to make preparations to deploy troops to the Black Sea. Before the end of the year, we may have to provide further evidence of our dedication to the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire.
Notes
1. Royle 19.
2. Ibid. 20.
3. Palmer 118.
4. Temperley 309.
5. Ibid. 315-6.
6. Ibid. 318.
7. Ibid. 319.
8. Ibid. 340.
9. Ibid. 333.
10. Royle 25.
11. Temperley 272.
12. Royle 25.
13. Goldfrank 133.
14. Royle 42.
15. Temperley 333.
16. Ibid. 336.
17. Treaty of Adrianople, 1829, plus additional Asian lands (Temperley 56).
18. Treaty of Ghulistan, 1813 (Lobanov-Rostovsky, Asia 106).
19. Unkiar Skelessi, 1833 (Lobanov-Rostovsky, Asia 114).
20. 1841, signed by Russia, Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria (Temperley 145).
21. Temperley 340-1.
22. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Asia119.
23. Goldfrank 156.
24. Mehmet Ali and Fuad were the likely negotiators with Leiningen in February 1853 (Temperley 302).
25. Goldfrank 152.
26. Royle 9.
27. Ibid. 6.
28. Temperley 311.
29. Ibid. 333.
30. Vinogradov 159.
31. Lincoln 57.
32. Ibid. 88.
33. Temperley 306. Orlov negotiated the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and had demonstrated an ability to work with the Porte.
34. Ingle 21.
35. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Europe 115.
36. Ingle 29.
37. Palmer 104, 118.
38. Ibid. 112. Stratford de Redcliffe had made his name by forcing internal governmental reforms in the Ottoman Empire.
39. Wetzel 65.
40. Royle 23. Common courtesy among European monarchs was to address each other as “mon frère”. Nicholas was the only monarch to refuse to give that courtesy to Napoleon after he declared himself Emperor of the French.
41. Reprinted in Bourne 317.
42. Ibid. 319.
43. Goldfrank 123. The Ottoman Empire refused to extradite the leaders of a failed Polish rebellion. Russia made military threats, so a British squadron entered the Dardanelles. Shots were never fired.Bibliography
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